The Ecclesiastical Deep State
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR: Buona Domenica! This past month has been a profound one for me and this blog, as I have received e-mails and calls from many Priests and lay faithful, expressing their enthusiasm for my recent essay The Emergent Clerical #MeToo Movement. I am deeply grateful for your support and prayers. I have been encouraged to continue to write in this vein. Everything I am writing has come from personal notes and thoughts over a decade old, as I never like to put finger to keyboard without having developed my thoughts.
Additionally, I am edified by how much the article has inspired practical and effective solutions: I am not in the business of channeling rage, but promoting hope and inspiring solutions that will make us more who we are, not less. I fear certain approaches border on the Alinskyite, in how they freeze and polarize. This may cause lasting harm, which I hope we can avoid if we anchor ourselves in reason, faith and charity, even in the face of contrary winds.
– AR
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The Ecclesiastical Deep State (Essay 2)
Today’s essay is meant to address a tertium quid among the problems we find plaguing the Universal Church. Many commentators, both within the Church and without, have been able to zero in on what I would call “primary loci” of ecclesiastical malfeasance. These would include, but are not limited to, Priests and Bishops. Critics see the problems in the Church, and firstly (and mostly correctly) ask questions of accountability and culpability among those who are meant to be leading her. Then they identify “secondary loci” in the policies and practices which enabled Priests and other people in positions of power to continue in their posts, or to be shuttled from assignment to assignment, without ultimately being answerable for their crimes.
However, what is frequently overlooked, mostly because so few people in the media or among the laity have a grasp of the inner workings of clerical culture or diocesan structures, is the long arm of the Church’s equivalent of the administrative state, which are the Diocesan Curiae.
If there is going to be any reform of the current lamentable state of relations between Priests and Bishops, and by extension, between the clergy and the laity, we need to have a look at these persons and offices which exercise, largely without accountability themselves, the will of Bishops. If personnel is policy, then we cannot complain about the policies of Bishops or the Bishops themselves, without having a long, hard look at those who carry out their will.
For sake of clarity, it may be helpful to list some of the Diocesan posts which possess authority in the name of the Bishop: for instance, the Vicar General, who possesses ordinary executive power in the Bishop’s name, the Judicial Vicar who judges canonical cases, the Moderator of the Curia, who oversees the administrative operations of the curia, the Chancellor who generally manages the records of the curia (such records are generally private). There is also the role of the Vicar for Clergy, who is generally in charge of managing the appointment and reassignment of Priests throughout the diocese.
Diocesan Power, Legitimate and Illegitimate
To begin, it is helpful to remind ourselves what the purpose of the Diocesan Curia is. This will require some patience from the reader. According to the Code of Canon Law, especially Canons 469-474, the Curia are those “institutions and persons which assist the bishop in the governance of the whole diocese, especially in guiding pastoral action, in caring for the administration of the diocese, and in exercising judicial power.” Furthermore, Canon 471, paragraph one and two say that those appointed to the curia must “promise to fulfill their function faithfully according to the manner determined by law or by the bishop…” and “observe secrecy within the limits and according to the manner determined by law or by the bishop.”
Let’s parse this for the sake of clarity, especially with a theological lens. As mentioned in my previous essay, the purpose of the Diocesan Curiae is essentially to assist the Bishop in his munus gubernandi, which means both “gift of governing” and “burden of governing”. We recall that this is both a theological and canonical concept, as distinct from a conception of jus gubernandi, which could be translated the “right of governing”, which is usually how discussions of secular governance and procedure proceed. This understanding is further reinforced in the Latin text of the Canons, which speak of Diocesan appointees promising to carry out/implement the munus (promissionem emittere de munere fideliter adimplendo) of the Bishop. Therefore, Diocesan Curiae, having essentially delegated power, are directly tied to his munera and their legitimate exercise.
However, we ought to note that within the words of the Canons themselves, especially Canon 471, there is what I would consider somewhat dangerous phraseology, that Diocesan officials must promise to fulfill their function faithfully according to the manner determined by law OR by the Bishop. As a grammatical remark, this possible understanding of the false parity of the bishop’s will and the law may be further reinforced by the ‘inclusive disjunctive’ vel rather than aut, as is used in paragraph 2.
Where does this leave us in terms of the ‘bare bones’ level of Canon Law? We have a situation in which the Diocesan Bishop may appoint to his ‘court’ various ministers, much like in a secular setting, but with critical differences. These ‘ministers’, much like in the secular realm, have delegated power to execute his will in various matters. I do not dispute a Bishop’s right to govern, or see this as wrong. If a bishop could not appoint his immediate staff, he may well find his diocese ungovernable. What I do suggest is that there is a fundamental lack of checks and balances. In many world governments, judicial and executive functionaries are approved by intermediate bodies in order to prove suitability for their office, as well as moderate the will of the Head of the Government. Yet this does not happen at all in Diocesan structures, nor is there a mechanism in place by which these appointees can be legitimately opposed. Moreover, reform in regard to Diocesan Curiae may end up benefiting most the welfare of curial officials themselves, because they could rely on a bedrock of support among rank and file clergy in the case that they themselves feel compelled to resist the illegal or immoral will of their bishop. Clergy outside of the curia ought to be able to have the ability to call out the malfeasance of the bishop’s ministers, but also the clergy and laity who occupy positions within the Diocesan structure ought to have the ability to protect themselves from being abused or threatened.
When the Curia goes rogue
On the other hand, many Priests and lay faithful have seen the tragedy of good, well meaning Bishops being partially or completely subverted by their own curiae. For instance, let’s say a Bishop goes from a small, rural diocese to a major Metropolitan See. Very often, he is completely at the mercy of men whose established interests for good or for ill go back decades. He does not know the presbyterate, he does not know the people, he does not know the very staff that in theory work for him. Therefore, he is often beholden to their expertise and knowledge, which can potentially be a dangerous prospect.
How can we help Bishops who may not even know that they are being undermined by their own staff? How can we help those bishops who wish to reform their diocese to be aware of pockets of resistance, or vested interests which directly contradict the Gospel, Catholic morals, and the rule of law? The Catholic blogosphere and dedicated news outlets are full of warnings about everything from a “Lavender Mafia” to things like the “St. Gallen Mafia”. Why are these things so hidden in plain sight, and how can we shine the light upon them?
One part of the solution may be for Diocesan Bishops actively and directly to spend time with their Priests: to have them over for meals at their residence, to pray the Liturgy of the Hours, and generally to create open fora for light conversation and candor. So many dynamics can be readily observed in a social environment. Additionally, diversifying the Curia across age groups may also be helpful, since each age group tends to bring different approaches, and have different objectives. Also, encouragement of clerical education in both secular and sacred fields may help alleviate the bureaucratic strain by moving the intellectual center of gravity away from the Chancery. In the words of the old proverb, knowledge is power: it is far more difficult for the Diocesan curia or a Bishop to bully a Priest who may have a Doctorate in Canon Law. Empowering Priests with a sense of competency keeps the body from being a menagerie of yes-men. Admittedly, these Priests will likely be more vocal in public, but it is always good for a Bishop, or any leader to hear the ‘minority reports’ which come out of an educated and faithful presbyterate. Above all, whatever is done, it will benefit everyone, both Priests and Bishops, to open as many channels as possible for communication and contact.
Triple Jeopardy: The Result of Administrative, Unaccountable Bodies
In the wake of the abuse scandal in 2002 in America and the subsequent John Jay Report on the problem of sex abuse in the Catholic Church, and in accord with the Dallas Charter and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, most Bishops in the United States have appointed Review Boards which evaluate the credibility of complaints against Priests. These bodies are appointed by the Bishop to act as a “confidential, consultative body to the bishop on matters related to the response of the local church to issues surrounding the sexual abuse of minors by priests and deacons” according to the USCCB Resource Booklet on the matter.
Granted the delicacy of the problem of sex abuse and other accusations, and also an upright desire to protect the good name and dignity of an accused Priest, I believe that in some respects there should involve a degree of secrecy. However, there are problems with Review Boards as they presently exist. I am personally aware, as are many others, of Priests who are cleared of all charges civil and canonical, and yet are in a sort of ‘Triple Jeopardy’ in regard to the Diocesan Review Board, and are unable to exercise their Priestly ministry, and all too often are reduced to the indignity of penury, or urged by their Bishops to forsake the exercise of their Sacred Orders, and seek laicization. Some Priests have been unconscionably incentivized to seek laicization by being offered the ecclesiastical equivalent of severance packages, which forces the Priest to choose between infamy and poverty, or to forsake their very identity, their ontological configuration which is the very core of any Priest who takes his vocation seriously.
Moreover, many Priests have been humiliated by charges which are questionable at best, by accusers who have no other basis for their accusation than their very word. In such cases, we must return to the old Roman legal dictum, Testis unus, testis nullus: if there is only one witness of a crime, the testimony is void. Even the Mosaic Law demanded the testimony of two or three witnesses before an accusation be considered founded. Why are our standards then so directly in opposition to Divine Law, good Civil Law, and common sense?
In many dioceses, the Review Board has become essentially an unelected Star Chamber, which strips Priests of their civil and canonical rights. These bodies confidentially advise the bishop, and are accountable to no one. It strikes me as exceedingly absurd that in the case where the state, with all its power to investigate, declares a Priest innocent of any wrongdoing, that a Review Board should be able to prevent a Priest from reassuming his office and restoring his good name. What is even more shameful is that a Bishop is essentially participating then in indirect calumny, by abetting the destruction of a man’s good name.
Does Ecclesial Subsidiarity Exist?
Another common complaint among Pastors especially is the increasing control of Diocesan Curiae of some of the most important functions of parishes. Some of these are done (rightly, I think) in the name of transparency and oversight, but in many respects create the opposite effect. The constant memos from the bureaucracy can reinforce the feeling of pastors being simply “branch managers”, with no true rights under the Law, which do in fact exist. Let’s consider for instance the practice of Pastors who are required by some dioceses to put on file their letter of resignation before they are appointed as such, so that the Bishop can easily remove them from office. This contradicts entirely the spirit and letter of Canon Law, and basic human decency: no pastor can be forcibly removed without a reason, usually related to faith, morals or official malfeasance, some of which are listed in Canons 1740-41.
Additionally, pastors and parishes are becoming increasingly hamstrung by the constant financial demands of their dioceses. The cathedratica and/or diocesan assessments continue to rise even as financial contributions among the faithful decrease. Pastors constantly have to seek approval to perform repairs, or make capital improvements above a very low cost ceiling.
Then there are the problems that exist regarding minutiae which are the prerogatives of the Pastor, or even individual Priests: what exact curriculum a parish or school must use for religious education, whether a Priest can own an animal in his rectory or smoke, and other things. I do not deny that a diocese should exercise oversight over parishes to ensure that heresy and liturgical disorder do not reign. I only think that the diocese should not have to micromanage the type of good which the Pastor and Parochial Vicars, with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and in accord with their own gifts, can or ought to perform.
We need a return to ecclesial subsidiarity, with the Diocesan Curiae existing at the service of the work of the salvation of the faithful and the world, and exercising restraint in interference. Any reform of our dioceses must involve a rediscovery of the quasi-inviolability of parishes and their pastors.
Musical Chairs, a Rotating Chancery
Although in Canon Law some principal posts, like a Vicar General who is not an Auxiliary Bishop, are appointed “only for a time”, (CIC 477,1) many posts, unless Diocesan norms say otherwise, may be occupied indefinitely at the pleasure of the Ordinary. This would not be controversial if it were not for the following, all too common phenomenon: that in many Chanceries, some of the same people have been there for decades, transcending and outlasting the leadership of numerous bishops. Admittedly, many of these posts require special training in Canon Law and other fields, and it may be expensive to train and educate more clergy, especially in smaller or more impoverished dioceses, but is it necessarily healthy for the Diocese, or for Chancery Officials themselves, to possess the same post for an elongated amount of time? Or, is it healthy for the institution if the man who was the Vicar General, is now the Chancellor, and the Chancellor is now the Vicar General, and so on? Many of us have seen the deleterious effects of this managerial shell game in government, education, the corporate world, and more. Would it not be better to impose term limits, or otherwise curtail their staying power, lest they think themselves as something semi-independent from the Bishop and his legitimate governance?
Further Possible Solutions: Transparency, Accountability
For decades now, if not centuries, both private and public entities have published minutes, transcripts, or even recorded video and audio of their meetings which touch public matters. Even in the judicial system of countries with the rule of law, court cases are usually public unless a judge decides they should remain secret for a particular grave reason. This has been done historically to ensure that trials are fair and that proper procedures are followed.
I believe it may be helpful that Review Boards and other bodies that advise their Bishop, when they make determinations regarding a Priest’s suitability for ministry or other grave deliberations, should have their reasons and minutes publically disseminated on diocesan websites for all to hear or read. Dioceses, much like the Vatican Bolletino or the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, should publish a daily or weekly summary of the regular and irregular meetings within the Curia, with a brief description of the reason for the meeting, much like the summaries of the Ad Limina visits of Bishops to the Pope. The Bishop’s remarks should also be made public. Efforts at coverage should be made to avoid sordid, hyperbolic or histrionic language: records should be matter-of-fact, and succinct. It is sufficient that Priests and lay people be appraised of what is going on in their chancery, all the while respecting the sensitivity of certain issues. Perhaps this task may be entrusted to the Chancellor who manages internal records, or to a third party. I admit this is a delicate balancing act, but the chancery can no longer afford to be a black box.
Also, Diocesan Curiae should be made, whether by Particular or, better, Universal Law to receive, with an established office and budget, a clerical and lay ombudsman whose purpose as a pair is to make perhaps quarterly reports on the status of the Chancery, and prepare these reports so the clergy and lay faithful may read them. The Priest ombudsman should be elected by popular vote of the Priests of the Diocese to be their representative, while the lay representative may be selected by the Priest ombudsman, because of the difficulty of securing a popular vote from among the lay faithful. These people may be precisely the ones who may initiate votes of no-confidence in Curial Officials and Bishops, a process which I suggested in my previous essay.
There was a time when Priests and their Bishops, much like a family, solved a lot of their issues “in house”. It was a way to protect the privacy and dignity of everyone involved. However, to do this when the environment has become toxic, and the family has become abusive, is no longer feasible. Theologians may speak of natural secrets which exist for the sake of protecting people from harm, yet the public actions which impact public persons, as all Priests are, require more transparency and accountability. A Priestly ombudsman should be able to sit on a Review Board with the other appointed members and be able to offer insights which are not merely based upon public relations and legal protection, but which are based on the dignity of the accused and the accuser. Priests often feel disenfranchised because they have no advocate. Let’s give them one by law. The Council of Priests and Diocesan Personnel Boards are insufficient to advocate for Priests, and are so frequently stocked with ex officio staff through the appointment of their Bishop, that their function as an effective expression of the needs of Priests is limited.
Like in my last essay, I admit these ideas are incomplete, and some may be discarded altogether, but are meant to start a constructive conversation among clergy and lay people. To draw from the words of C.S. Lewis regarding democracy, the decentralization of power is medicine to a disease. We all know that absolute power corrupts absolutely. The more we move for a system where the rule of law is respected, and perhaps adopt new ways to keep everyone accountable, we will keep honest bishops honest, and clergy will be less likely to feel they play by a different set of rules.
